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Abstract—In any given collaboration, information needs to flow 
from one participant to another. While participants may be 
interested in sharing information with one another, it is often 
necessary for them to establish the impact of sharing certain 
kinds of information. This is because certain information could 
have detrimental effects when it ends up in wrong hands. For this 
reason, any would-be participant in a collaboration may need to 
establish the guarantees that the collaboration provides, in terms 
of protecting sensitive information, before joining the 
collaboration as well as evaluating the impact of sharing a given 
piece of information with a given set of entities. The concept of a 
trust domains aims at managing trust-related issues in 
information sharing. It is essential for enabling efficient 
collaborations. Therefore, this research attempts to develop a 
taxonomy for trust domains with measurable trust 
characteristics, which provides security-enhanced, distributed 
containers for the next generation of composite electronic 
services for supporting collaboration and data exchange within 
and across multiple organisations. Then the developed taxonomy 
is applied to possible scenarios (e.g. Health Care Service Scenario 
and ConfiChair Scenario), in which the concept of trust domains 
could be useful. 
Keywords-Trusted Computing; Trustworthiness; Human Aspect 
of Security; Trust Domains; Usable Security; Information Security 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Why trust is so important in online activities? Trust is an 
element that entails in online exchange relationships 
characterized by uncertainty, anonymity, a lack of control and 
potential opportunism [1]. In online relationships, such as 
online transactions often require sharing of sensitive 
information (e.g. username, password, emailing address or 
telephone number), corporate information (e.g. airline 
reservation or inventory data) and financial information (e.g. 
credit or debit card numbers) among the transacting parties. 
Therefore, trust helps to ensure that one does not take an 
advantage of others during or after the particular transaction.  
There has been an increasing interest in the imperative of 
trust in societies in general and in organizations in particular 
[2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [19], [20]. However, 
there is no common integrative taxonomy to interpret the extant 
literature and to guide future research regarding online trust 
related issues [4], [19], [20] . Li [11] offers a systematic 
review; other authors [12], [13] present a meta-analysis. 
Clearly, some aspects of trust are subjective; moreover there 
are many contextual factors in play. It is often related to and 
also affected by individuals’ differences and their situational 
factors [9]. It is true that different people interpret the role of 
trust quite differently in various situations and have a different 
scale of trust towards different trustees. The Trusted 
Computing Group defines trust by saying “an entity can be 
trusted if it always behaves in the expected manner for the 
intended purpose”[14].  
Information sharing is an essential part of any business 
process. Every day, organizations and individuals exchange 
information for the purpose of service delivery, communication 
and collaboration [21]. For example, a researcher wishing to 
set-up an experiment may write an email to an infrastructure 
provider, describing the experiment and specifying the resource 
requirements for the experiment. This experiment could be of a 
sensitive nature, such as development of a vaccine or stem cell 
research and therefore requires that its content, intention or 
existence be known only to a selected list of individuals and 
organizations. Similarly, two law enforcement agencies 
working on similar cases may require sharing information 
about the evidence of a crime. However, each agency may need 
to share such information with only a selected list of other 
agencies or individuals from these agencies. In this case, how 
does one on the selected email list ensure the information 
shared by someone else hasn’t been altered or contaminated by 
intruders? In general, we tend to trust people on our email list 
[21] [22]. However, there might be a hidden risk of 
contaminating the information (e.g. email message) during 
online transmission. A popular maxim captures the essence: 
“Trust is good, but control is better” [15]. There is, therefore, a 
need for mechanisms that allow parties to share such 
information while restricting its flow to the selected entities. 
The research work reported in this paper introduces an 
integrative taxonomy for trust domains. The concept of trust 
domains is meant to be used for proving a foundation 
(evidence) for securely sharing information (how, when and 
with whom) among a group of entities. This enables the parties 
involved and the observers to understand the level of trust 
before going ahead with sharing data. 
The reminder of this paper is structured in the following 
manner. Section II describes the elements of trust domains. 
Section III discusses the useful infrastructure models to 
develop our proposed taxonomy for trust domains. In section 
IV, we introduce a taxonomy for trust domains, which enables 
to securely share the information among the others. Then the 
 introduced taxonomy is applied to a possible scenario in 
Section V. Section VI provides conclusions and opens up 
opportunities for future work that may extend the research 
work reported in this paper.  
II. ELEMENTS OFTRUST DOMAINS 
In this paper, we are interested in providing these 
mechanisms in a way that enables the parties involved in 
information sharing to understand: i) the level of security that 
will be achieved together with the risks mitigated; ii) the 
mechanisms used to achieve it; and iii) economic, performance 
and scalability implications. Most importantly, these 
mechanisms should allow these parties to evaluate the above 
characteristics before they go ahead with sharing the 
information. To achieve this, we propose the notion of a trust 
domain as a concept that makes this possible - enabling 
organizations and individuals to maximize their business 
profitability through efficient and secure information sharing.  
To start, we need to identify and define concepts that could 
help us capture the notion of a trust domain. In this paper, we 
are interested in identifying and characterizing these concepts 
in order to: i) provide perspectives from which to discuss the 
concept of a trust domain; ii) enable instantiation of trust 
domains with varying properties; and iii) provide integration 
and interoperability mechanisms. We build a model that 
captures the concepts that could be used to describe a trust 
domain and relationships among those concepts. 
The model assumes that a trust domain will require some 
social structure as well as infrastructure support. The social 
structure provides regulatory and monitoring mechanisms for 
individuals and organizations involved in a trust domain as 
well as a means for assigning responsibility and appropriate 
penalty in the event that information flows to unwanted parties. 
The infrastructure, on the other hand, serves to provide 
mechanisms that ensure that technical systems involved in or 
used as a means of processing, communicating or sharing 
information observe and enforce the required information flow 
constraints. Therefore, we take an approach in which we 
identify some of the existing mechanisms that could serve as 
fundamental building blocks for a trust domain and then we 
find possible integration points to enable the conceptualization 
of a trust domain. 
III. USEFUL INFRASTRUCTURE MODELS 
Our taxonomy for trust domains embraces systems 
deployed on diverse infrastructures. Each infrastructure may 
employ different technologies to serve the needs of a trust 
domain. However, at the architectural level, several aspects 
can be identified to be common among the various types of 
infrastructure. Of interest to develop taxonomy for trust 
domains are the Web Services Architecture [16] and the 
Trusted Multi-tenant Infrastructure (TMI) [17]. 
A. Web services Architectural Model 
The Web Services (WS) Architecture [16]defines functional 
components, relations among them and constraints upon 
which they operate. The architecture defines four models 
(message-oriented, policy, service-oriented and resource) that 
capture concepts and relations among them as viewed from a 
certain perspective. We collect the concepts defined in these 
models into an integrated architectural model as illustrated in 
Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Integrated model for the WS Architecture - showing the link between service, message, resource and policy models 
The message-oriented model defines Message as a first 
class concept that has a Sender and one or more Receivers. A 
message is delivered by some MessageTransport mechanism, 
which is constrained by a DeliveryPolicy. The Delivery Policy 
is a subclass of Policy, defined in the policy model, which 
defines MessageReliability properties of the MessageTransport 
 mechanism. Messages are used as the main mechanisms for 
communicating requests for services and responses to the 
requests - where a service is defined, in the service-oriented 
model, as an abstract resource capable of performing one or 
more tasks. This definition of a service allows us to link a 
service to a Resource defined in the resource model through a 
subclass relation. 
A resource has State and is owned by a person or 
organization that defines a Policy that governs how a Resource 
is used or behaves. This policy is also defines the scope of a 
domain and is defined in a way that captures the desired goal 
state. Policies capture permissions that are required by certain 
agents in order to enable certain resources attain some state and 
obligations that agents have on the resources. Permissions are 
enforced by a PermissionGuard while Obligations are enforced 
by an Audit Guard. 
B. Trusted System Domain Model 
The TCG TMI Working Group [17] aims to build a set of 
specifications for trustworthy operation in multi-tenant 
infrastructures. As part of this effort, the working group has 
released the first version of the use cases for a TMI. We use 
these use cases to build a model that includes concepts and 
relations among the concepts defined in the use cases. The 
concepts capture the parts of a TMI while the relations capture 
the dependencies, causalities and interactions among the 
concepts necessary to capture the functionality of a TMI as 
described in the use cases. 
The model, illustrated in Figure 2, is built around three 
main entities, Policy, Asset and Role. An Asset is an entity that 
is of value to a person or organization that participates in a 
TMI. Its value is defined by the entity that has an interest in it. 
Implying that the same asset could have different values 
depending on whose point of view this value is being 
computed. A Policy is a piece of data that defines the 
constraints on how the assets are used or accessed by entities 
within a TMI as well as the expected behavior of such entities. 
A Role is a set of responsibilities assumed by an entity in the 
system. It also defines the activities that any entity with such a 
role can perform. 
 
 
Figure 2: A model for the trusted multitenant infrastructure 
TMI distinguishes between two main roles, Consumer and 
Provider, and defines several concepts some of which are 
generic across domains of the two roles while others are 
specific to each domain. A DomainAuditAgent is defined as a 
generic agent that forwards AuditEvent to the 
CentralAuditStore – a component that stores audit events 
collected from various parts of a TMI. The 
ConsumerAuditAgent and ProviderAuditAgent are subclasses 
of DomainAuditAgent that are specific to Consumer and 
Provider domains respectively. 
Each Role establishes a Policy that is published to a 
DomainPolicyStore and also creates a 
DomainManagementAgent to manage the domain according to 
the policy they define. This Policy is expected to be enforced 
by a PolicyEnforcementPoint in the domain in which the policy 
is setup, and is monitored by the specific type of 
DomainAuditAgent for the particular domain. Consumer 
DomainManagementAgent and ProviderDomainManagement 
Agent are subclasses of DomainManagementAgent that are 
specific to Consumer and Provider domains respectively. 
 A Resource is defined as a subclass of Asset, which has 
State and can be provisioned or de-provisioned in the Provider 
domain by the ProviderDomainManagementAgent. To ensure 
that the correct policy is being enforced on a resource, the 
Consumer can validate the state of the resource using the 
ConsumerDomainManagementAgent. 
IV. PROPOSED TRUST DOMAINS TAXONOMY  
In this section of the paper, we discuss how the models 
identified above are combined to create trust domain 
taxonomy. We illustrate the concepts that can be used to 
integrate the models and discuss how the semantic gap in the 
usage of these concepts can be bridged. 
 
A. Fundamental Concepts and Relations 
The proposed model consists of a number of concepts, 
such that each concept captures a class of things that may 
exists in a trust domain, be used to build a trust domain and 
used within a trust domain. Though all these concepts may be 
used in different instances of a trust domain, a few of them can 
be identified as being fundamental to the existence of a trust 
domain. We identify the Data, Policy, Controls, Roles, 
Actions and Evidence as being fundamental concepts 
necessary to build a trust domain. 
As depicted in Figure 3, a Role owns Data that will exist 
within a trust domain and establishes a Policy that constrains 
Actions. 
 
 
Figure 3: Fundamental concepts in a trust domain 
 
As mentioned in the fundamental model, a Role establishes 
one or more policies within the domain. However, any given 
policy can only be established by one role. This means that if 
two roles establish identical policies, then both policies are 
treated as a unique entity, which can be linked through the 
equivalence property. 
Actions are performed by a given role or by some agent 
that represents a particular role. These actions are monitored 
by Controls to ensure that the policy is being upheld. These 
controls produce Evidence to indicate that actions have been 
performed in accordance to the policies. Both Evidence and 
Policy can be considered to be a form of data, which can be 
manipulated in the same way as other data and may be subject 
to the same information flow restrictions. We describe each of 
these concepts in the following subsections. 
1) Asset 
Our conceptualization of a trust domain is based on the idea 
of enabling secure information flow among a set of entities. 
Such entities may each have a set of devices through which 
they share the data. Furthermore, these entities may provide 
access to the information stored on the devices or other media 
to other members of the domain. For this reason, we define the 
concept of an Asset as being a fundamental element of a trust 
domain. An asset is something of value to the owner, but 
could also be valuable to other entities such as attackers or 
competitors. One example of an asset is data. Data may exist 
in many different forms and indeed each form is faced with 
various kinds of challenges, with respect to controlling how it 
flows. For example, printed material could be prevented from 
being taken out of the building. However, it is still possible 
that someone could scan the materials and send it over a 
network or copy it to USB stick. For this reason, different 
types of protections maybe required to overcome each type of 
challenge. To reduce the scope of our work, we limit the 
model to data that exists in digital form. Other examples of 
assets include: resources such as computers; services such as 
web services; and communication infrastructure such as 
networks.  
2) Policy 
Policies are a means of specifying the behavior of entities 
within a trust domain and how data flows within or outside of 
a trust domain. Each policy specifies the expected 
relationship/dependency between one or more entities within a 
domain. For example, a policy can be used to specify the data 
allowed to into or out of a trust domain, the characteristics of 
the controls that should exist in a trust domain and the kind of 
evidence that these controls should provide. To satisfy the 
requirements for a trust domain, the policy being enforced, 
how it is being enforced and the decisions made in relation to 
this policy must be made explicit. 
3) Controls 
Controls are a set of mechanisms, processes or procedures 
that enforce the policies within a trust domain. These controls 
could be accomplished through social, e.g. penalties, or 
technical means e.g. trusted computing. Controls monitor 
activities that occur within a trust domain and produce 
evidence, described below, that can be used to determine the 
properties of a trust domain or its constituents. 
4) Roles 
Roles are used to specify the level of participation in a trust 
domain. Each role defines the kinds of activities that an entity 
assuming that role can do as well as the kinds of things that 
entities would be accountable for. Roles are also a way of 
separating concerns in a trust domain and isolating the 
activities that participants can perform in a trust domain. 
5) Actions 
Actions are a series of functionalities performed by 
components and agents in a trust domain. An action typically 
either consumes or produces some data or results in the change 
of state of a particular component or system. Depending on the 
level of abstraction desired, an action can be divided into sub-
actions where each sub-action contributes to the overall 
outcome of the parent action. 
6) Evidence 
Evidence is data that is produced by the controls within a 
 trust domain to indicate the kinds of activities that have 
occurred in a trust domain. These activities are captured by 
monitoring the actions that are performed by or on behalf of 
roles that exists within a trust domain. Examples of such 
evidence include; provenance - records of how data came to 
be; audit logs - log of events that occur during the lifetime of a 
trust domain; integrity measurement lists - a record of the 
binary hashes of software components and data in a trust 
domain; and digital certificates - specify the cryptographic 
identities of components that perform certain actions. 
  
B. Integrating Infrastructure Models 
The fundamental concepts discussed above exist in more 
than infrastructure model. To build a taxonomy for trust 
domains that makes use of these models, we need to 
understand how the models can be integrated together. To 
achieve this, we use the fundamental concepts as integration 
points, so that each concept that exists in more than one model 
is linked using equivalence. This allows all the relations that 
apply to a concept in a particular model to apply to an 
equivalent concept in another model. As an example, Policy, 
which is defined in the fundamental model, exists in the 
trusted system domain model as well as in the policy model of 
the Web Service (WS)-architecture. This allows us to relate 
the policy concept in the Trusted System Domain (TSD) 
model to the Permission concept in the WS policy model, 
through the equivalence property between the two policy 
concepts and the captures property. 
Using this approach, however, is faced with the challenge 
of a possibility of conflicts and inconsistencies. For example, 
in the WS policy model, the policy is defined by a person or 
organization while the TSD model specifies that a policy be 
established by a Role. To address this issue, we first identify 
that is a possible relationship between person or organization 
and role. Using this relationship, we can then determine which 
the appropriate concept to be linked directly to the common 
concept, i.e. Policy. In this particular case, we decided on Role 
because it is possible that other entities such as autonomous 
systems might be able to set-up a policy. 
 
C. Integrated Model 
In this section of the paper, we describe an integrated 
model to form a taxonomy for trust domains resulting from the 
integration effort described above, also illustrated in Figure 4. 
We define a DomainEntity as a first class entity in a trust 
domain. It is defined as an entity that has a memberOf relation 
to the Domain and has exactly one of the following types: 
Person, Organization, System, Process, Resource or Agent. 
Furthermore, each Domain EntityhasRole within the domain. 
In this model, we do not restrict the membership and the role 
relationship, so that a domain entity may participate in more 
than one domain at any given time and may assume more than 
one role. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: A taxonomy for trust domains 
 
 
 
  
We define a Policy as data whose scope is limited to a 
Domain. In other words, a policy is only effective within the 
domain. It does not directly in the behavior or properties of 
entities outside the domain. This, however, raises a question of 
how to define identical domains (i.e. domains that enforce 
exactly the same kinds of policies). To answer this question, 
we define a Policy to be singleton object but allow it to be 
cloned; for example, copies can be made for use in other 
domains. The cloned policy can be linked to the original 
policy through the equivalence property. 
 
 
A policy is publishedTo the DomainPolicyStore by a 
DomainManagementAgent and is consumed by the 
PolicyDecisionPoint, which creates PolicyDecisions. Policy 
Decisions exist in the form of Permissions or Obligations and 
are enforced by a type of control called 
PolicyEnforcementPoint. The policy decisions can be 
considered as a type of part of evidence, which together with 
some policy meta-data can be used to support how the policy 
has been broken down into enforceable constraints. 
An important aspect in trust domains is the ability to relate 
the decisions to the policies that triggered these decisions. For 
example, when a constraint specifies that a certain action be 
permitted, trust domains must be able to demonstrate how that 
constraint (i.e. to permit an action) was reached and the 
policies, which influenced this decision. For this reason, we 
define influenced as a relation between the set of policies and 
the set of decisions, which were used to arrive at the decisions. 
For this to work, we require a policy to be consumed by a 
PolicyDecisionPoint that creates the PolicyDecision. 
 
 
A Role may also own Agents, which may act on their 
behalf, and Assets, which are shared with other members of 
the domain. Assets have a type, i.e. AssetType, which could 
either be Resource, Data or Service. Furthermore, the model 
specifies that individual assets and agents must be owned by 
exactly one Role. 
Actions are performed on Assets by Domain Entities and 
controls within the domain. However, before an action can be 
performed, certain constraints determined by the policy must 
be satisfied. For this reason, we specify that Policy 
constrainsAction. To enable checking that appropriate 
constraints are satisfied before an action is performed, controls 
within the domain monitor actions. 
 
 
Resources are an important aspect of trust domains. In this 
model, we define a resource as an asset type, which has state. 
A resource can be provisioned or de-provisioned by controls 
within the trust domain. When a resource is provisioned, it 
becomes available for use by agents and domain entities that 
request for Assets (including Resources) in the domain. The 
state of the resource also plays an important role in 
determining the properties of a trust domain. We therefore 
allow state to be validated by DomainManagementAgent. This 
validation determined whether or not the behavior or state of 
resources is in-line with domain policies. 
A special type of control, referred to as DomainAuditAgent, 
is responsible for generating audit events by monitoring the 
activities in the domain. The DomainAuditAgent forwards 
AuditEvent to a CentralAuditStore where they can be analyzed 
as part of evidence to determine the properties of a trust 
domain and alerts the DomainManagementAgent when certain 
critical events are observed. 
 
 
We define messages as the main mechanisms for accessing 
services provided within the domain. Each message has a 
Sender and one or more Receivers; both defined as agents and 
are delivered through some MessageTransport mechanisms 
such as Remote Procedure Call (RPC) or Web Services, which 
is constrained by a DeliveryPolicy. The model defines a 
service as a Resource, which may be providedBy another 
Resource. 
 V. APPLICATION  SCENARIOS 
In this section of the paper, we attempt to define possible 
scenarios such as Health Care Scenario and ConfiChair 
Scenario. Then the developed taxonomy is applied to possible 
scenarios, in which the concept of trust domains could be 
useful. 
 
A. Health Care Service Scenario  
We consider a scenario, in which, a number of health 
institutions (i.e. hospitals or clinics) provide specialist services 
to their clients. Each service uses one or more databases to 
store data collected from interactions with their clients. The 
data collected maybe shared with other services, restricted to a 
particular service or isolated from other data stores within a 
single service. The specialist service providers are monitored 
for quality and financial purposes by Monitoring Services. For 
this reason, monitoring services may require access to certain 
parts of the data collected at a particular site. Furthermore, 
various monitoring services may need to share part of the data 
and keep some of it private. 
We illustrate, in Figure 5, an example setup in which three 
specialist services share some parts of their data among 
themselves and two monitoring services that may access all or 
part of the data collected at each site. Each specialist service 
has a Demographics database and a number of other databases. 
In addition to the Demographics database, each service has the 
following other databases: Specialist Service 1 (SS1) has a 
Diagnostics database; Specialist Service 2 (SS2) has Scans 
and Treatment databases; and Specialist Service 3 (SS3) has 
Births database. Specialist Service 1 (SS1) and Specialist 
Service 2 (SS2) are monitored by Monitoring Service 1 (MS1) 
while Specialist Service 3 (SS3) is monitored by Monitoring 
Service 2 (MS2). Monitoring Service 1 (MS1) and Monitoring 
Service 2 (MS2), each have some databases where the 
monitoring data is stored. 
 
Figure 5: Information flows within health provision and monitoring 
 
1. Data Flow Relations & Trust Domains Application 
In this section of the paper, we attempt to apply the 
developed taxonomy for trust domains to the above-mentioned 
scenario (in this case Health Care Service Scenario). This is 
achieved by identifying the boundaries that exist with respect 
to data flows within the setup. 
SS1 and SS3 have agreed on a policy to allow data to flow 
between their Demographics databases. SS3 has, additionally, 
agreed on a similar policy but with SS2. These results in two 
intersecting trust domains, SS1-SS3-Demo-TDom and SS2-
SS3-Demo-TDom, are shown in Figure 6. According to the 
above-scenario, patients’ demographics information (in these 
case “Assets”) can only be shared between the blood bank and 
the cancer clinic. The maternity clinic has agreed on a similar 
policy but with only the cancer clinic. Therefore, this can be 
accomplished by defining policies, specifying the behaviour of 
entities within the trust domain and how data flows (in this 
case bi-directional) within the trust domain. Penalties or 
technical means (e.g. email warnings messages or systems 
generated warning messages) can be used to control activities 
that occur within the trust domain. These activities captured by 
monitoring the actions, can be used to produce evidence such 
as records of how demographics data came to be, audit logs- 
log of events that occur during the lifetime of a trust domain. 
Therefore, these controls produce evidence to ensure that 
actions have been performed according the policies defined as 
represented in the trust domains taxonomy. 
 
 
Figure 6: Trust Domains involving demographics data flow 
 
SS1 and SS2 agree to share diagnostic and scan information 
between them. This agreement defines a bi-direction data flow 
between the two databases resulting in a trust domain, SS1-
SS2-Findings-TDom, as shown in Figure 6. According to the 
above-scenario, patients’ diagnostic and scan information (in 
this case “Assets”) can only be shared between the blood bank 
and the cancer clinic. Therefore, this can also be accomplished 
by defining policies, specifying the behaviour of entities 
within the trust domain and how data flows (in this case bi-
directional) within the trust domain. Penalties or technical 
means (e.g. email warnings messages or systems generated 
warning messages) can be used to control activities that occur 
within the trust domain. These activities captured by 
monitoring the actions can be used to produce evidence such 
as records of how diagnostic and scan information came to be, 
 audit logs- log of events that occur during the lifetime of a 
trust domain. Therefore, these controls produce evidence to 
ensure that actions have been performed according to the 
policies defined as represented in the proposed trust domains 
taxonomy. 
 
(a) (b) 
 
Figure 7: Internal SS3 Trust Domain (a), Monitoring statistics Trust 
Domain (b) 
 
SS3 has an internal one-directional data flow from the 
Demographics database to the Births database. Data is not 
allowed to flow in the other direction. This creates a trust 
domain, SS3-Internal-TDom, as shown in Figure 7(a). 
According to the above-scenario, patients’ demographics and 
birth information (in these case “Assets”) can only be 
accessible by the maternity clinic. Additionally, the data is 
only allowed to flow from the Demographic database to the 
Birth database. Therefore, this can be accomplished by 
defining policies, specifying the behaviour of entities within 
the trust domain and how data flows (in this case one-
directional) within the trust domain. Penalties or technical 
means (e.g. email warnings messages or systems generated 
warning messages) can be used to control activities that occur 
within the trust domain. These activities captured by 
monitoring the actions that can be used to produce evidence 
such as records of how demographics and birth information 
came to be, audit logs- log of events that occur during the 
lifetime of a trust domain. Therefore, these controls produce 
evidence to ensure that actions have been performed according 
the policies defined as represented in the proposed trust 
domains taxonomy. Finally, MS1 and MS2 have a mutual 
agreement to allow data to flow between their statistics 
databases, resulting in a trust domain, MS1-MS2-Stats-TDom 
illustrated in Figure 7 (b). According to the above-scenario, 
patients’ birth as well as treatment and their visit statistics 
information (in this case “Assets”) can only be shared between 
the two monitoring databases. Therefore, this can be 
accomplished by defining policies, specifying the behaviour of 
entities within the trust domain and how data flows (in this 
case bi-directional) within the trust domain. Penalties or 
technical means (e.g. email warnings messages or systems 
generated warning messages) can be used to control activities 
that occur within the trust domain. These activities captured by 
monitoring the actions that can be used to produce evidence 
such as records of how patients’ birth as well as their 
treatment and visit statistics information came to be, audit 
logs- log of events that occur during the lifetime of a trust 
domain. Therefore, these controls produce evidence to ensure 
that actions have been performed according the policies 
defined as represented in the proposed trust domains 
taxonomy. 
This case illustrates that trust domains will differ in their 
nature. Some will exist within a single entity such as an 
organisation or department while some will cross-
organisational boundaries. Furthermore, some trust domains 
will place restrictions on the direction of data flow and others 
(e.g. the Demographics trust domains) will have some level of 
transitivity in their data flows. One thing common to all the 
domains, however, is that there is an agreement between the 
parties involved, which defines what data can flow within the 
domain as well as the direction of its flow. Other properties 
will definitely exist and this warranties the need for further 
investigations into the nature and expected properties of trust 
domains. 
 
B. ConfiChair Scenario  
ConfiChair is a cloud-based conference management 
protocol developed by researchers from Birmingham 
University [18]. It is proposed to address a set of privacy and 
confidentiality requirements for existing cloud-based 
conference management systems such as EasyChair or the 
Editor’s Assistant (EDAS). In ConfiChair, as shown in Figure 
8, authors, reviewers and the conference chair interact through 
their browsers with the cloud, to perform the usual tasks of 
uploading and downloading papers and reviews. It is 
noteworthy that privacy and the data confidentiality issues 
concern the cloud-based conference system administrator who 
administrates the system for all conferences (not the conference 
chair, who is concerned with a single conference). For 
example, the cloud based conference system administrator 
could accidentally or deliberately disclose some sensitive 
information (e.g. strongest and weakest reviewers) because the 
service provider has access to all the information related to 
conferences hosted by the conference management system.  
 
      
Figure 8: Trust Domains involving demographics data flow 
 
1. Data Flow Relations & Trust Domains Application 
In this section of the paper, we attempt to apply the 
 developed taxonomy for trust domains to the above-mentioned 
scenario (in this case ConfiChair Scenario). This is achieved 
by identifying the boundaries that exist with respect to data 
flows within the setup. 
According to the ConfiChair scenario shown in Figure 8, 
authors, reviewers, and the conference chair interact through 
their browsers with the cloud, to perform the usual tasks of 
uploading and downloading papers and reviews. Additionally, 
the conference system administrator is responsible of 
administrating the ConfiChair system for all conferences. 
Therefore, the role element in the taxonomy is represented in 
the ConfiChair scenario. Various roles carry some actions 
developed by the ConfiChair system. Author upload/download 
papers, reviewer reviews papers, conference chair referees the 
process and the conference system administrator administrates 
all conferences are a few examples. Therefore, the action 
element in the taxonomy is represented in the ConfiChari 
scenario. A set of policies developed within the ConfiChair 
system. For example, (a) a reviewer doesn’t see other 
reviewers of a paper before writing her own, (b) the 
Conference System Administrator does not have access to the 
content of papers or reviews, or the numerical scores give by 
the reviewers to papers and (c) the conference system 
administrator does have access to the names of authors and the 
names of reviewers; however, he does not have ability to tell if 
a particular author was reviewed by a particular reviewer. The 
policy element in the taxonomy is, therefore, represented in 
the ConfiChair scenario. The following controls also 
developed in the ConfiChair system in order to monitor 
actions: (a) the login procedure implemented relies on each 
user having an identity id and a secret password pswid; (b)
 secrecy of papers, reviews and scores: conference 
system administrator does not have access to the content of 
papers or reviews, or the numerical scores given by reviewers 
to papers; (c) unlinkability of author-reviewer:  conference 
system administrator does not have access to the names of 
authors and the names of reviewers and (d) however, all 
sensitive data (e.g. encryption of each review or score) is seen 
by the conference system administrator only in encrypted 
form. Therefore, the control element in the taxonomy is also 
represented in the ConfiChair scenario. The following 
evidence such as information produced by 
uploading/downloading papers, reviewing papers, refereeing 
the ConfiChair system process and also administrating all 
conferences through the ConfiChair system is maintained by 
the ConfiChair system. The evidence element in the taxonomy 
is therefore represented in the ConfiChari scenario. Finally, 
data such as authors, reviewers, conference chairs and 
conference system administrator information; paper 
upload/download/submission information; paper review 
information; and referee process information exist in digital 
form within the ConfiChair system. Therefore, the asset 
element in the taxonomy is represented in the ConfiChair 
scenario.  
The author uploads/downloads (in this case bi-directional) 
papers and the reviewers reviews (in this case bi-directional) 
those uploaded papers using the ConfiChair system. 
Therefore, this creates a trust domain, Author-
ConfiChairSystem-Reviewer. According to the ConfiChair 
scenario shown in Figure 8, the conference chair referees the 
process. This creates two trust domains, Author-
ConfiChairSystem-ConferenceChair as well as 
ConferenceChair-ConfiChairSystem-Reviewer.  
Finally, the conference system administrator is responsible 
of administrating the ConfiChair system for all conferences 
where the conference chair referees the conference process. 
The conference system administrator does not have access to 
the names of authors and the names of reviewers and as well 
as all sensitive data (e.g. encryption of each review or score) is 
seen by the conference system administrator only in encrypted 
form. Therefore, this creates a trust domain, ConferenceChair-
ConfiChairSystem-ConferenceSystemAdministrator.  
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK    
This paper has presented a taxonomy for Trust Domains 
which enables individuals and organizations to securely 
collaborate across functions, geographies and corporate 
boundaries by providing collaborating parties (or participants) 
the means to create online environments designed to prevent 
information from leaking and where their resources can be 
shared as they specify. For this, Trust Domains relay on 
mechanisms ensuring that information flow to the right entities 
and that information is only accessed by entities capable of 
protecting it as specified. Furthermore, for future research, to 
help participants decide whether a trust domain is able to 
protect their resources, additional mechanisms enable 
participants to verify whether the entities composing the trust 
domain behaved and currently behave as required. By 
developing a mechanism to represent Trust Domains and 
reasons about their properties, we expect to support tool 
integration and decision-making based on the integration of 
evidence from disparate sources. 
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